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Publication of signed contributions does not signify adoption of the views
expressed by the REvIEW or its Editors collectively.
"11Ty keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by
because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet which
have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."--OLrv
WENDELL HOLES, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 269 (1920).

Comments
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN CRIMES
ARISING FROM THE SAME TRANSACTION
Three armed men break in on four patrons of a tavern, line them against the
wall at pistol point and relieve each of his valuables one at a time. An individual
is indicted for the robbery of three of the victims and these indictments are joined
for trial. The prosecution proves that there was a robbery, but only one of the

(513)
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victims (not named in the indictments) identifies the accused, while three of the
victims testify that he is not the robber. The defense is the testimony of the accused
that he was not present at the tavern on the afternoon of the robbery. The jury
returns a verdict of not guilty. The state subsequently indicts the accused for the
robbery of the fourth victim, who is the only person who identified him at the first
trial. What effect does the prior acquittal have on the subsequent prosecution? Is
the state collaterally estopped from re-litigating issues necessarily found in favor
of the accused in the prior trial? These were the facts and issues in the recent
case of Hoag v. New Jersey' in which the New Jersey court held that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel did not apply because there was no way of knowing exactly
what was the basis of the jury's verdict of acquittal reached in the first trial. 2 On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding no violation of due
process, and expressing grave doubts whether the widely espoused doctrine of
collateral estoppel has any application in constitutional law.8
It is submitted that the following questions are implicit in determining a sound
approach to the problem of whether or not the prosecution should be permitted to
retain and play an "ace in the hole" by way of a subsequent prosecution. How can
adequate protection be secured to the interest of society in punishing crimes arising
out of the same transaction without forcing the accused to defend numerous prosecutions and "run the gauntlet" at the state's pleasure? 4 What application should be
assigned to the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this type of factual situation?
What application should the doctrine of collateral estoppel have to the plea of
former jeopardy? Finally, is there any place in constitutional law for the doctrine
of collateral estoppel?
The doctrine prohibiting double jeopardy is ancient, being imbedded in the common law and incorporated in most constitutions5 in this country.0 The doctrine
forbids a second trial as well as a second punishment for the same offense.1 The
purpose of this doctrine, as it should be construed by the, courts, is to protect persons
accused of crime from vexatious criminal prosecutions, and at the same time protect society's interest against crime going unpunished.8 In order to accomplish this
purpose, the test for former jeopardy must be a practical one, and not theoretical.0

1. 356 U.S. 464 (1958); 8 DE PAuL L. Rv. 102 (1958); 32 Tsm'. L.Q. 113 (1958);
2 U. ILL. L.F. 472 (1958).
2. State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 500, 122 A.2d 628, 632 (1956).
3. 356 U.S. at 471.
4. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957).
5. Mo. COirST. art. I, § 19 (1945) reads: ".... [N]or shall any person be put again
in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, after being once acquitted by a
jury."
6. Ex parte Dixon, 330 Mo. 652, 52 S.W.2d 181 (1932) (en banc); State v.
Toombs, 326 Mo. 981, 34 S.W.2d 61 (1930); and see Lugar, Criminal Law, Double
Jeopardy, and Res Judicata, 39 IoWA L. RPv. 317 (1954).
7. State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937); Annot., 113 A.L.R.
222 (1938).
8. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
9. Murphy v. United States, 285 Fed. 801 (7th Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 261 U.S.
617 (1923).
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Courts take a variety of approaches to determine whether an accused has been
twice placed in jeopardy in cases where there are multiple crimes arising out of the
same transaction.10 Two tests are generally applied, the "same evidence" test, and
the "same transaction" test. The "same evidence" test is applied in a majority of
jurisdictions. Generally it is stated in terms of whether the same evidence would
support a conviction in either case."1 In the H-oag case, as an example, the same
evidence under the first indictments would not have supported a conviction under
the subsequent indictment and trial because different evidence concerning the person
robbed and the property taken would have been necessary to convict in the second
trial.12 The "same transaction" test which is applied to some extent in a few
jurisdictions is that there can only be one prosecution for the consequences of a
single criminal transaction.13 The "same transaction" test would bar the subsequent
prosecution in the Hoag case because even though there may be many offenses which
took place during the same transaction, only one prosecution can take place for the
whole transaction.14
The prohibition against double jeopardy embodied in the fifth amendment' 5 is
directly applicable to criminal trials in the federal courts,' 6 but is only applicable
to the action of the state courts by virtue of the fourteenth amendment as a denial
of due process.' 7

10. Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941); State v. Fredund, supra
note 7; Lugar, supra note 6; see Annot., 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943).
11. Hoag v. New Jersey, supra note 3, at 467, states the usual New Jersey rule
"that double jeopardy does not apply unless the same evidence necessary to sustain
a second indictment would have been sufficient to secure a conviction under the
first, But see Gully v. State, 116 Ga. 527, 42 SE. 790 (1902) which held that "To
entitle the accused to plead successfully former acquittal, the offenses charged
in the two prosecutions must have been the same in law and fact." See Lugar, supra
note 6 showing a variety of wordings and interpretations of the same test. The rule,
whatever it has now become in a given jurisdiction, was first laid down in Rex v.
Vandercomb, 2 Leach. 708, 2 East P.C. 519 (1796).
12. But see United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
297 U.S. 703 (1936), and Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923)
where rather ludicrous results followed application of this rule to cutting open
six mail sacks, and playing seventy five hands of poker during the same transaction,
respectively. See also Note, 24 MNu. L. Ry. 522 (1939) pointing out obvious inconsistencies in application of the rule.
13. Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8 (1853); Dowdy v. State, 158 Tenn. 364, 13 S.W.2d
794 (1929); State v. Coffman, 149 Tenn. 525, 261 S.W. 678 (1924). But see Note, 32
McH. L. Rav. 512 (1934), criticizing the strict application of the same transaction
test.
14. This result is apparently reached under the theory that there was only one
crime, so that the defendant could not be tried twice for the same offense. The
"same evidence" test attempts to pin-point what offense in the transaction has been
tried, while the "same transaction" test treats the whole transaction as one crime
only.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...
16. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957).
17. Hoag v. New Jersey, supra note 1; Palko v. Conneticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Since most courts proceed under the "same evidence" rule, and each criminal
act directed toward a different individual is generally held to be a separate offense,
there is no violation of the interpreted meaning of double jeopardy even whenthese
crimes arise out of the same transaction.
It has been well argued, however, that there is but one actual criminal transaction in this situation and since historically the plea of double jeopardy was first
conceived to prevent vexatious criminal trials for crimes closely or actually related, the "same evidence" rule violates the purpose of the protection against double
jeopardy. 18 Be this as it may, most courts are adamant in holding that prosecution
for each separate offense during one transaction does not violate their interpretation of double jeopardy or due process. The result is that the prosecution is able,
even though it knows of all the separate offenses committed during one course of
criminal conduct immediately related in time, space, and nature of act, to hold back
an indictment and have an "ace in the hole" if it is not successful during the first
prosecution. In the Hoag case, the New Jersey court recognized this practice, but
assumed that the state would exercise sound discretion to preserve the rights of the
accused and not without reason subject him to multiplicity of trials.19 The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction but stated that it was preferable to try all of them
together.20 Both courts decided the Hoag case by the narrowest majorities2 ' and
it is probably a valid assumption that both courts felt that this type of prosecution
could violate the spirit if not the letter, of the doctrine of former jeopardy.
Collateral estoppel in civil cases is defined in the following terms by the
Restatement of Judgments:
(1) Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action.
(2) A judgment on one cause of action is not conclusive in a subsequent
action on a different cause of action as to questions of fact not actually litigated and determined in the first action.
18. Note, 24 Xne. L. Rsv. 522, 550 (1940) states: "However equally as obvious,
it is submitted, is the violation of the spirit of double jeopardy principles which
the result of such cases entail. To the minds of the criminal, the ordinary laymen,
and very likely the framers of the constitutional provisions, the defendant is guilty
of but one crime." People v. Grzesczak, 77 Misc. 202, 206, 137 N.Y. Supp. 538, 541
(Nassau County Ct. 1912). See the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Hoag v.
New Jersey, 356 U.S. at 475, and Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958). The Court in
a per curiam opinion held that there was no violation of due process when the defendant was separately tried three times for burning the three members of his
family. On the last indictment the defendant was finally sentenced to death. Mr.
Justice Douglas, with the Chief Juistice and Mr. Justice Brennan, dissented on the
basis of the proposition announced above. Mr. Justice Black dissented for the
reason that the fourteenth amendment bars a state from placing a defendant twice
in jeopardy for the same offense.
19. State v. Hoag, 35 N.J. Super. 555, 559, 114 A.2d 573, 577 (Super Ct. 1955);
State v. Hoag, supra note 2.
20. 356 U.S. at 467-68.
21. 4-3 in the New Jersey supreme court; 5-3 in the Supreme'Court of the
United States (Mr. Justice Brennan not sitting).
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The doctrine of collateral estoppel is operative where the second action
is between the same persons who were parties to the prior action. . ..
A
judgment for the defendant in the first action may have the effect of
22
furnishing a complete defense to the second action.
As an example, suppose A sues B for an installment of interest due on a note.
B denies making the note. Verdict and judgment for B. In a subsequent action for
a further installment, A is collaterally estopped from bringing the action because
the first action necessarily determined that the note was not made, and is binding
on the parties, and is a bar to A maintaining the subsequent action.
The criminal question would compare with the civil example as follows. A is
indicted for robbing B. A denies being present during the robbery. A is acquitted.
In a subsequent prosecution for robbing C at the same time B was robbed, is the
state collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of A's presence so that the
verdict for A in the first trial is a bar to the subsequent prosecution.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues which
necessarily must have been decided during the first trial in any subsequent action
between the parties wherein the same issue is in question. The adverse decision
of fact in the first trial is binding in the subsequent proceedings as though the
23
matter were res judicata.
In United States v. Oppenheimer 2 4 the defendant pleaded former adjudication
to an indictment charging a conspiracy to conceal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy. The first trial, for substantially the same offense, had been decided for
the defendant because the statute of limitations barred a conviction. His motion to
quash the subsequent indictment on the grounds of former adjudication was granted.
The government's contention, on appeal, was that the doctrine of res judicata2 5
does not exist for criminal trials except in the modified form of the fifth amendment that a person shall not be placed twice in jeopardy of life or limb for the
same offense. Mr. Justice Holmes, for the majority, holding to the contrary, adopted
the language of Hawkins, J., in Queen v. Miles:
Where a criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a Court having
jurisdiction to hear and determine it, that adjudication, whether it takes
the form of acquittal or conviction, is final as to the matter so adjudicated
upon, and may be placed in bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.... In this respect the criminal law is in unison with that which
prevails in civil proceedings. 2 6
Mr. Justice Holmes added:

22.

RESTATMU=, JUamGsus § 68 (1942).
23. Ibid.
24. 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
25. Courts tend to use the terms res judicata and collateral estoppel interchangeably. In this case, what is really referred to is the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
26. 24 Q.3BD. 423, 431 (1890).
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The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has
tended to give the impression that when it did not apply in terms, there
was no other principle that could. But the Fifth Amendment was not intended
to do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice...
in order, when a man has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the Govern27
ment to prosecute him a second time.
In United States v. DeAngelo,28 the defendant was indicted for robbery of a
bank messenger and for conspiracy to commit robbery. He was acquitted on the
robbery indictment.2 9 In the subsequent trial under the conspiracy indictment
the government attempted to raise the issue of defendant's presence, an issue
necessarily found in favor of the accused in the previous trial. Defendant attempted
to introduce his previous acquittal as a defense. The trial court refused to admit
the previous acquittal, and he was convicted. The circuit court of appeals granted
defendant a new trial on the ground that the government was estopped from relitigating in a criminal trial facts theretofore materially in issue at the former trial between
the same parties for a different criminal offense.3 0
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court in Sealfon v. United States31
where the defendant was first tried and acquitted of conspiracy to defraud the
government by presenting false invoices and making false representations to the
ration board. In a subsequent trial he was convicted for aiding and abetting the
issuance of false invoices. In reversing the conviction, the Court said:
But res judicata may be a defense in a second prosecution. That doctrine
applies to criminal as well as civil proceedings ... and operates to conclude
those matters
in issue which the verdict determined though the offenses
32
be different.
The Court stated further that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is generally accepted
88
as applicable in criminal proceedings.
Two questions may be raised to the application of collateral estoppel in criminal trials. (1) May a determination of the issues actually adjudicated in the first
trial be made when the jury returns a general verdict? (2) Would the stated doctrine of collateral estoppel work in favor of the state as well as against it, so that
the accused would be collaterally estopped in a subsequent proceeding from again
contesting an issue of fact previously found in favor of the state?
According to a recent Supreme Court decision, the general verdict poses little
problem. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.3 4 was an action to recover

27. 242 U.S. at 88.
28. 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943).
29. Defendant's only contention was that he was not present at the scene of
the crime. It was alleged that he was driving the get-away car.
30. United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1943).
31. 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
32. Id. at 578.
33. Ibid.; see Annot., 147 AL.R. 991 (1943).
34. 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
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treble damages under the Clayton Act. General Motors offered to prove that they
were not operating in restraint of trade in Chevrolet automobiles. In a previous
prosecution by the government, they had been convicted of restraining trade in
Chevrolets. The Court held that where the' criminal judgment rests on a general
Verdict of the jury,
.. .what was decided by the criminal judgment must be determined by
the trial ... upon examination of the record, including the pleadings, the
evidence submitted, the instructions under which the jury arrived at its
verdict, and any opinions of the courts.3 5
The Supreme Court stated further that "what issues were decided by the former
Government litigation is, of course, a question of law on which the court must
instruct the jury."36 In the DeAngelo case,37 the court inquired into the facts
which the jury must have found to acquit in the prior trial, viewed them in light
of the evidence and instructions, and concluded that the essential element (the
presence of the accused at the scene of the crime) must have been concluded in
favor of the petitioner and upheld his plea.38 The same analysis was used in the
Sealfon case and a similar result reached.
It would appear then that the question of whether a determination of the
issues litigated can be made in the general verdict situation has been answered by
the federal courts in the affirmative. It is the duty of the trial judge in the subsequent proceedings to determine what issues must have necessarily been found in
order to sustain the general verdict on the basis of the pleadings, evidence, instructions, and an examination of the whole record of the first trial.39

35. Id. at 569. But where defendant was convicted during the first trial, that
conviction establishes rather easily that defendant committed all the acts necessary
to commit a crime. Where defendant is acquitted in the first trial, any number of
things might have been responsible for the jury's verdict.
36. Id. at 571.
37. Note that this is a case of the first jury acquitting the accused.
38. 138 F.2d at 469.
39. Suppose the defendant is indicted for the murder of X, who was strangled.
During the same transaction, it is also alleged that he murdered Y by stabbing him.
During his trial for the murder of X, defendant relies on an alibi established by
testimony that a former injury has severly limited his capacity to grip or squeeze
with his hands. The jury acquits the defendant for the murder of X. In the subsequent trial for the alleged murder of Y, the trial judge is to decide what the first
jury's general verdict was based on. It could be that they believed he had established
an alibi, or that he did not have the physical capacity to commit murder by strangulation. In addition, the jury could have believed that the state failed in their burden
of proof, that a state's witness lied, or any one of several other possibilities. There
might also be present problems relating to the defendant's capacity to form the required intent in a given case. However, this problem is not insurmountable. The
same transaction test could be applied altogether so that acts directed toward
different individuals or things in the same transaction would be treated as one
triable offense only. The doctrine of collateral estoppel could be applied to work in
favor of the accused for all issues that he contested in the first trial, as a qualification
"rule of evidence" for the same evidence test. See United States v. Carlisi, 32 F.
Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). The same result could be accomplished by legislation
requiring all crimes arising from the same transaction to be subject to a single
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The second question is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to
both parties in a criminal case. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
does apply to both parties in civil proceedings. The objection to two-way application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a criminal trial is that it denies the
accused the constitutional and common law right to present all defenses in his
behalf.40 It is submitted that the logic of the conclusion of mutuality in criminal
trials is merely illusory, and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply
against the accused in criminal trials. Herein lies the distinction between collateral
estoppel in civil and criminal trials. As previously pointed out, the doctrine of
former jeopardy in criminal trials should be applied to avoid vexatious criminal
prosecutions. 41 Collateral estoppel in civil trials is related to res judicata, a doctrine
which prevents re-litigation of issues in civil suits. Collateral estoppel in criminal
trials is related to double jeolpardy which prevents vexatious criminal prosecutions. 42
In the DeAngelo case the court held, in reversing the conviction, that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel characterized as a rule of evidence, did apply in favor of the
accused, and by dictum indicated that there was no requirement of mutuality in a
criminal trial:
But a 'rule of evidence' has been recognized 'which accords to the accused
the right to claim finality with respect to a fact or group of facts previously
determined in his favor upon a previous trial' 4 3 (Emphasis added.)
Among the facts previously litigated was the accused's presence and participation,
and the jury's first verdict of acquittal determined these matters adversely to the
44
government.
Assuming the foregoing discussion is correct, what purpose should the doctrine
of collateral estoppel serve in cases like the Hoag case where there is an alleged
violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy, or a denial of due process under the
fourteenth amendment? It has been held that an individual could be tried and convicted separately for each hand of stud poker played during the same four hour
span. 45 Seventy-five hands were played. The court stated that each "pot" played
for involved a separate offense under the statute, and since the evidence necessary

prosecution only, unless good cause is shown why this is impractical in a given
situation. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08 and comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
The purpose of this statute as stated by the authors is to prohibit unfair multiplicity
of convictions or prosecutions, and to prohibit the conviction for two offenses which
require inconsistent findings of fact to establish their commisson.
40. This objection seems to be stated in terms of a truism. Quaere whether
once having presented all his defense, defendant has a right to do so again. However,
if the state has a right to split up its prosecutions, then perhaps it is not inconsistent
to insist that the accused has the continued right to present his defenses.
41. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
42. See United States v. Carlisi, supra note 40, for an example of the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and a discussion and history of the general
problem which tends to support the thesis set out.
43. 138 F.2d at 468. Accord, United States v. Carlisi, supra note 40, at 482.
44. 138 F.2d at 469.
45. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1932).
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to convict the defendant for playing for one pot would not be the same as that
necessary to convict for a subsequent pot, there was no reason why conviction for
46
one could be a bar to conviction for another. It is submitted that at some point
during the prosecution of these seventy-five separate indictments, this type of
prosecution will violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
second suit probably violates the stated purpose of the plea of double jeopardy as
it should be applied by the courts, i.e., protecting the accused from the burden of
47
The
defending against vexatious criminal prosecutions at the state's pleasure.
courts, in order to escape this conclusion, have adopted the "same evidence" rule.
The question now arises as to why the appellate courts allow this practice, in view
of the fact that these courts often state that they will "look to the substance rather
than the form" of the matter before them to determine whether justice has been
done. The answer is possibly found in the following rationalization. The state can
only prosecute each offense once, and cannot appeal except under limited conditions.
There exists a fear that for one reason or another the state may not receive a
"fair" trial on the first prosecution. Therefore, the plea of former jeopardy may be
disregarded by the test of whether the evidence would support a conviction in a
48
technical sense under the various indictments.
This reasoning results in inconsistent conclusions. On the one hand the protection against vexatious prosecutions is given, and on the other hand it is taken
away because of the fear that the state will not receive a fair trial, and cannot
appeal. Consequently, the state is allowed the benefit of restricting the accused's
plea to such an extent that its historic purpose is thwarted. In order to reach at
least a consistent result, the prosecution should be allowed to appeal as readily as
the prosecuted. Without such a procedure, it would appear that the courts have provided the state with some protection against an "unfair" trial where the defendant
has been unfortunate enough to commit several crimes during the same transaction.
As a result the accused may be subject to even greater harrassment than if the state
49
were allowed an unlimited right of appeal.

46. The statute prohibited the engaging in a game of hazard or of chance at
which money, or other property was bet, won, or lost. In reading the opinion of the
court, it would appear not only that the defendant could have been prosecuted for
each "pot" played, but also for each bet he placed. The case involves separate convictions and not a prior inconsistent verdict. The court here allowed the prosecutor
to seek the verdict he desired separately. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
47. An individual who gambles more than once can be, and should be, punished
more than the defendant who only bets once. But where the acts of the accused
violating the statute are done all at once, the state advisedly should bring only one
prosecution.
48. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy, and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. RaV.
317 (1954); Note, 24 Mlum. L. Rav. 522 (1939).
49. If the state were allowed to appeal more readily, there would be no motive
on the part of the prosecutor to save back an indictment. The source of the inconsistency that the courts have arrived at would no longer exist. The state would
no longer need the protection the courts have given where multiple crimes take place
during the same transaction (which has not been given in the single-crime situation) because it would have adequate protection in both situations. This procedure
would allow consistent results in the following situation also. If the defendant is
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A partial remedy to this inconsistent situation would be the utilization of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. In extreme cases similar to the Hoag case, successive
prosecutions might violate the due process clause. Collateral estoppel would preclude
this possibility, preserve the legal significance of the first jury verdict determination that the accused was not present during the entire transaction, and secure to
the defendant the common law protection against double jeopardy despite the
application of the "same evidence" test. Using the Hoag case as an example, an illustration of the scope and application of collateral estoppel can be brought into
sharper relief. Assume in the subsequent trial, Hoag introduces his prior acquittal
and the first trial record, alleging that since there was but one contested Issue in
the first trial, whether he was present or not, that the first verdict of the jury
necessarily determined that he was not.5 0 All the crimes took place at the same time,
and if he was not present, he could not be guilty of robbing any of the victims. The
trial judge then determines whether or not this issue was determined in Hoag's
favor at the first trial through examination of the pleadings, evidence, record, and
instructions of that trial. Assuming that he does determine this issue was resolved
in favor of the defendant in the first trial, that determination acts as a bar to a
conviction under the second indictment and it should be quashed.0 1 If Hoag had
contested many issues in the first trial, the duty of the judge remains the same,
but it is more difficult to perform. Suppose Hoag had shown during the first trial,
that nothing had been taken from the first three victims, and was acquitted on
presumably that basis. That finding would not preclude the present prosecution. If
he had contested both the issue of his presence and that nothing was taken from the
victims as charged in the first indictment, the trial judge's determination may or may
not bar the present prosecution. The fact found in favor of the accused at the first
trial must be a fact essential to a conviction in both cases before the subsequent
prosecution is barred, as in the case of double jeopardy. But, as a qualification of
the "same evidence" test, facts found in favor of the accused cannot be re-litigated
in the second trial.
accused of killing forty victims by secreting a bomb in an airplane, he has done
only one criminal act. Although the defendant has killed forty people and is guilty
of that many murders, it is generally agreed that he can be prosecuted only once for
his criminal act. See 2 U. IL. L.F. 472 (1958). Under present doctrines, however,
if the defendant shoots all forty persons during the same transaction, he can be
subject to numerous prosecutions, even though previously acquitted or convicted
of any one of them. Note the similarities and distinctions between the two situations.
Are these conclusions sound?
50. Where there is only one contested issue during the first trial it would clearly
appear that a determination of what the jury found to acquit is reasonably apparent.
In Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 476 (1958) Mr. Chief Justice Warren in his
dissent emphasized the point of contested issues. See Justice Hehrer's dissent in
the New Jersey supreme court, State v. Haag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956), and
People v. Grzesczak, 77 Misc. 202, 137 N.Y. Supp. 538 (Nassau County Ct. 1912).
51. It should be pointed out here that should the judge deny the defendant's
plea, that decision would be a basis for appeal. This does not complicate trial and
appeal procedure to any greater extent than ordinary cases where an appeal is
made on the basis of an error at law. A practical aspect may present itself at this
point also-administrative difficulty of obtaining the complete records of the first
trial in which the defendant was acquitted.
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If however, the state is barred in the subsequent prosecution, its remedy does
not depend upon whether or not the prosecution received a "fair" trial in the prior
prosecution. Suppose for example, the state really does receive an unfair trial
during the first prosecution because Hoag had established his alibi by what was
later proved to be perjured testimony. Should the doctrine of collateral estoppel
still be applied in a subsequent prosecution for a crime alleged to have taken place
during the same transaction? It is submitted that perjury in connection with the
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not demand any different treatment than in the
single-crime, single-prosecution case. 52 The state's remedy for unfairness should not
lie in its ability to hold back an indictment and reprosecute an accused where
multiple crimes have occured during the same transaction, when the doctrine of
double jeopardy precludes this procedure where only a single crime is committed.
The prohibition against vexatious criminal prosecutions should be no more or no
less in one situation than in the other. The defendant who commits more crimes
than one during the same transaction should be more heavily punished, than the
one who commits only one crime, but this does not afford a logical basis for more
than one prosecution in the multiple-crime, same-transaction situation. The state's
protection against unfairness should be the unlimited right of appeal, and not continued prosecution. In the multiple-crime, same-transaction situation as in the
Hoag case, the state's protection against a future prosecution being barred should be
in its right to a joinder, with an unlimited right of appeal to preclude unfairness.
Broadly stated, the advantages of applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel
in the multiple-crime, same-transaction situation are that it preserves the protection against vexatious criminal prosecutions, and makes that protection consistent with the protection afforded in single-crime cases; it preserves the legal
significance of the first jury verdict, and it provides a reasonable basis for solving
the question of whether the accused has been convicted by prosecutions not consistent
with the requirement of due process. The principal limitation on the use of collateral estoppel is the difficulty of determining what issues were determined by the
jury's general verdict in the first trial.
Despite its limitations, collateral estoppel is a reasonable and justifiable doctrine
within its scope of application. It is submitted that its zone of application lies in
the following combination of circumstances: (1) the accused has committed multiple
crimes at the same time, or during the same criminal transaction, and the prosecution splits these crimes into separate indictments; (2) in the first trial, the jury
acquits the accused, and the issue or issues that necessarily must have been decided
in favor of the accused must be reasonably apparent from the pleadings, evidence,
instructions, and any other records; (3) the issue or issues so decided in the first
trial must be material for conviction of all the crimes alleged to have taken place
during the same transaction. When these requirements are present, if the state
attempts to play its "ace in the hole" by a subsequent indictment and prosecution,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied as a bar to the subsequent pros-

52.

Contra, Annot., 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943).
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ecution. The state can avoid this bar by joinder. By the application of collateral
estoppel within this zone, a legally consistent, reasonable, and justifiable result
is obtained which precludes separate prosecutions for multiple crimes arising out
of the same criminal transaction.
TROY RICHARD MAGER

MORTGAGES-LEASING CLAUSE IN THE MISSOURI
DEED OF TRUST
The Missouri realty mortgage or deed of trust frequently contains a clause providing that the trustee leases the mortgaged premises to the mortgagor. The precise
terms incorporated in this clause may vary somewhat as to the amount and time of
rental payments and as to surrender of possession. The usual provision, however,
expresses that the trustee leases the mortgaged premises to the morgagor until the
instrument be satisfied and released, or until default, at a rental of one cent per
month, payable on demand, and that the morgagor will surrender peaceable possession
to the trustee or purchaser thereof within a certain time (usually ten days) after
the foreclosure sale, without notice or demand. The primary significance of this
leasing clause in Missouri is to permit the trustee or purchaser at foreclosure sale
to recover possession of the mortgaged premises utilizing the statutory action of unlawful detainer.1
The operation of this clause is best illustrated by a brief discussion of the Missouri mortgage theory, generally said to be the "intermediate" theory. In this state
the mortgage or deed of trust operates as a lien against the realty, with title and all
rights of ownership remaining in the mortgagor 2 so long as there is no default in
the terms of the instrument.3 Under this theory the right to possession of the
mortgaged premises, in the absence of stipulation, remains in the mortgagor until
default, at which time the trustee or mortgagee can demand possession and enforce
his right thereto by ejectment. 4
Owing to the fact that an ejectment suit takes considerable time and is rather
expensive and because many persons seeking possession are landlords, the expedient
and economical possessory action of unlawful detainer is provided by statute in Missouri. Unlawful detainer operates where a tenant lawfully in possession fails to pay
rent or remains in possession after his term has expired or has been terminated by

1. § 534.030, RSMo 1949.
2. In re Thomasson's Estate, 355 Mo. 274, 171 S.W.2d 553 (1943); Reynolds v.
Stepanek, 339 Mo. 804, 99 S.W.2d 65 (1937); Missouri Real Estate & Loan Co. v.
Gibson, 282 Mo. 75, 220 S.W. 675 (1920); Kennett v. Plummer, 28 Mo. 142 (1859);
Manser, Real Estate Mortgage Theory In Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv. 200 (1941); Eckhardt,
Property, 4 Mo. L. REv. 419, 423 (1939).
3. Wakefield v. Dinger, 234 Mo. App. 407, 135 S.W.2d 17 (Spr. Ct. App. 1939);
JONES, MORTGAGES § 41 (8th ed. 1928).
4. Lustenberger v. Hutchinson, 343 Mo. 51, 119 S.W.2d 921 (1938).
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notice. The relief sought is possession, damages and overdue rent. 5 In actions under
this statute only right to possession may be inquired into; 6 the tenant cannot dispute
his landlord's title in an unlawful detainer suit." Under the first clause of this statute,
which refers to hold-over tenants, unlawful detainer does not lie unless the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties; whereas, under the second
clause, which refers to an employee holding over after termination of employment,
such relationship need not appear. 8 Discussion as to the leasing provision will be restricted to the first clause of the statute.
Consequently, before the trustee or purchaser at foreclosure sale can obtain the
benefit of the action of unlawful detainer, a landlord and tenant relationship must
exist between himself and the mortgagor in default. The effect of the aforementioned
one cent leasing clause, according to Missouri cases, is to create such a landlord and
tenant relationship between the parties. 9 Whether this relationship is substantial or
nominal raises a serious problem which is not fully answered by the courts. One
case held that the lease was a valid basis for unlawful detainer even though the
trustee had not signed the deed of trust.' 0 As a result thereof, the claimant has
acquired the advantage of an expedient and economical remedy to recover possession
without having to resort to the less desirable common law action of ejectment.
Since the primary purpose of the leasing clause is the prompt removal of the
mortgagor in default, it should state the express terms upon which the mortgagor
is to surrender peaceable possession. Confusion as to the requirement of demand or
notice may be avoided if the lease is properly worded. In Swaby v. Boyersil the
court held that a provision in the one cent leasing clause providing that the possessor
remove within ten days after sale, without notice or demand for possession, was
valid; no notice was required, nor was such demand necessary in case of a willful
holding over by the tenant. The court rejected defendant's contention that notice
to quit was required because the clause was indefinite and void rendering defendant
a tenant at will, changed into a tenancy from month to month by a reservation of
monthly rental. That provision may be constrasted to the situation where the clause
expressly provides that in the case of sale under the deed of trust the grantor will
remove from the premises any time thereafter upon one month's notice from the
purchaser. In such a case the courts require notice as expressly provided.12 Thus,

5. 4 GILL, REAL PRo-ERTY LAw n MssouRi 1676-80 (1954).
6. Shull v. Hatfield, 240 Mo. App. 275, 278, 202 S.W.2d 916, 917 (K.C. Ct. App.
1947); Beery v. Hoelzel, 171 S.W.2d 741, 743 (K.C. Ct. App. 1943); Joseph v. Horan,
29 S.W.2d 234, 235 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930).
7. Hurley v. Stevens, 220 Mo. App. 1057, 1061, 279 S.W. 720, 722 (K.C. Ct. App.
1926).
8. Bruner v. Stevenson, 73 S.W.2d 413 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
9. Beery v. Hoelzel, supra note 6; Y.W.C.A. v. Lapresto, 169 S.W.2d 78 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1943); Bruner v. Stevenson, supra note 8; Swaby v. Boyers, 221 S.W. 413 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1920).
10. Y.M.CA. v. Lapresto, supra note 9.
11. 221 S.W. 413 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920).
12. Parsons v. Palmer, 124 Mo. App. 50, 101 S.W. 609 (K.C. Ct. App. 1907),
(leasing clause in deed of trust provided for an eight dollar instead of one cent
monthly rental).
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the intention of the parties to the lease may be assured protection by expressly
providing in the clause the explicit terms as to surrender of possession. The trustee
or purchaser at foreclosure sale may desire the most expedient remedy, whereas the
mortgagor may prefer demand or notice. Whatever their agreed intention may be,
the foregoing decisions indicate that, in the absence of ambiguity, the express terms
of the leasing clause will be enforced.
The question now raised is whether the landlord and tenant relationship created
by the one cent leasing clause entail certain disadvantages of an ordinary landlord
and tenant situation. At least two problems may be anticipated in this connnection.
The first relates to legislation dealing with landlord and tenant; the second refers
to the tort liability of a landlord.
The problem of compliance with the provisions of the Federal Housing and Rent
Act in relation to the leasing clause was encountered in the Missouri case of Oldharn
v. Dupree.13 The court held that since the deed of trust provided that the defendant
mortgagor became lessee of the property at a rental of one cent per month until
foreclosure and delivery of the trustee's deed whereupon the mortgagor agreed
to deliver possession to the new owner without notice, a landlord and tenant relationship was created. Furthermore, since the plaintiff bottomed her case on the theory
that she was landlord and the defendant her tenant, she would have to recover on
that theory, if at all. However, since she failed to prove compliance with the Federal
Housing and Rent Act relating to evictions,1 4 the plaintiff was denied recovery of
possession in an unlawful detainer suit. The ramifications of this decision are somewhat doubtful and speculative. At the present time the case remains isolated without
further judicial interpretation. The opinion indicates that the court recognized the
created landlord and tenant relationship to be substantial in the sense of requiring
compliance with provisions of the Federal Housing and Rent Act which are directed
at an ordinary landlord and tenant situation. Thus, the decision gives rise to a
disadvantage in using the leasing clause in the deed of trust by requiring compliance
with the tenant eviction provision of the Federal Housing and Rent Act prior to
bringing suit in unlawful detainer.15
A second issue may be raised as to price-ceiling and the rental value of the
premises. If a price-ceiling were declared under authority of the Federal Housing
and Rent Act,16 as a wartime measure or otherwise, would the one cent monthly
rental be declared as the basic rental value of the premises? Certainly, this is a

13. 228 S.W.2d 14 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 249 (1950).
14. 61 Stat. 200 (1947), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1899 (1953).
15. 61 Stat. 200 (1947), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1899 (1953), Since this statute
has been frequently amended and may be enforced in local areas by executive
order, it is not practical to set out the provisions and its applications in this Comment.
Any person interested in the exact wording of the provisions should refer to the act
itself.
16. 61 Stat. 197 (1947), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1894 (1953).
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possible, though not a practical, result under the decision of the Oldham case. As to a
short term mortgage, an alternative to avoid such circumstances might be to increase
the one cent monthly rental to a reasonable rental value, declaring that such rent,
payable on demand, would be applied against the principal and interest of the
mortgage debt. Thus, if the price ceiling were applied by reason of the leasing
clause in the deed of trust, it would seem that the landlord would not be precluded
from receiving a fair rental from the tenant. However, as a long term mortgage,
a change in economic conditions prior to expiration of the lease might result in a
set rental value substantially less than the fair market rental of the premises. If a
price ceiling were declared, by reason of the rental expressed in the lease the
landlord's return, though substantial in amount, would be clearly inadequate as
compared to the fair market value at that time. In such a case it might be better
to use the one cent rental, chancing that this nominal value would be disregarded
as a basis for any price ceiling which might be ordered.
Whether the relationship created by this clause is substantial or nominal presents
a further problem relating to the tort liability of an ordinary landlord.1 7 Extensive
research has not disclosed an answer to this question.' 8 Certainly such liability for
actionable injuries to persons on or off the premises by reason of dangerous conditions or activities would place an undue burden on the trustee or purchaser at
foreclosure sale. Since the usual clause enumerates only a nominal rental value and
the lessor does not acquire or retain any right to control of the premises, there would
seem to be no practical basis upon which to predicate such liability. In other words,
it appears that the relationship created thereby is nominal and operative only for
purposes of the unlawful detainer suit.
In conclusion, it may be safely asserted that the one cent leasing clause in the
Missouri deed of trust is a valid basis for the statutory action of unlawful detainer.
In order to prevent confusion as to the requirement of demand or notice the clause
should include express terms as to the mortgagor's surrender of possession. When
applicable, the trustee or purchaser at foreclosure sale must comply with the existing and appropriate provisions of the Federal Housing and Rent Act relating to
eviction of tenants. Whether a rental price ceiling under authority of that act would
apply to the mortgaged premises is unanswered; however, as to a short term
mortgage, this difficulty might be avoided by providing for a fair rental value which
is to be applied against the principal and interest of the mortgage debt. Futhermore,
it appears that although the leasing clause creates a nominal relationship of landlord and tenant between the trustee and mortgagor for purposes of the unlawful
detainer suit, there is no practical basis upon which to predicate landlord tort
liability.
LAmay D. DINGUS

PROSSER, ToRTs § 80 (2d ed. 1955).
18. This Comment is confined to Missouri cases; extensive, not exhaustive research has failed to disclose the use of a one cent leasing clause in other jurisdictions
in connection with the realty mortgage or deed of trust.
17.
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RESTRAINTS ON LABOR AND CORPORATE EXPENDITURES
IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS
HImToRY OF SEcnoN 610, Tn=

18 U.S.C.'

In recent times numerous political leaders and theorists have expressed concern
regarding the amount of money expended by individuals and organizations for the
purpose of influencing federal election results. Elihu Root expressed the desirability of restricting the use of aggregated wealth to elect congressmen. 2 In his 1906
annual message to Congress, Theodore Roosevelt recommended legislation to prohibit
corporations from contributing money for political purposes.3 Congress responded
in 1907 with an act 4 which prohibited national banks and corporations from making
a "money contribution in connection with" a federal election. This act was held constitutional in United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 5 but in practice it was
not effective to prevent the evils which prompted its passage. Subsequently legislation was enacted requiring publication of contributionsc and in 1918 it was made
unlawful to either offer or solicit anything of value to influence voting.7
In an attempt to increase the effectiveness of this policy the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act s was enacted in 1925, which made substantial changes in the 1907 act. 9
Political contributions by federal civil service workers are now restricted by the
same type of legislation.10 To counteract the effect of strikes during World War II,
the War Labor Diputes Act 1" was passed, bringing labor unions under control of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act for the duration of the war.
The last major change in this area was section 304 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 12 which amended the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act, to include labor unions and added the word "expenditure" to supplement "contribution." This is the position of section 610 today.
JuDIciAL TREATMENT OF SEcTIoN 610

Problems in judicial interpretation of section 610 seem to center around two
questions which cannot be answered by a mere reading of the statute: (1) What
acts are encompassed within the meaning of the words "contribution" and "expen-

1. The act prohibits any corporation or labor union from making a contribution
or expenditure in connection with a federal election.
2. RooT, ADDRESSES OF GovEmnnnrr AxD CrrzNswsn 143 (Bacon & Scott ed.
1916).
3. 41 CONG. REc. 22 (1906).
4. 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
5. 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
6. 36 Stat. 822 (1910); 37 Stat. 25 (1911).
7. 40 Stat. 1013 (1918).
8. 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-56 (1925).
9. One of the most important changes was the elimination of the word "money",
so that any "contribution in connection with" a federal election was prohibited.
10. Hatch Political Activity Act, 62 Stat. 720, 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1948).
11. 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
12. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
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diture"? (2) What is the scope of the phrase "in connection with"? Although the
cases do not afford a complete answer to these questions, some insight as to the
problems of construction presented may be gained by their examination.
The statute in its initial form 13 first came to the attention of the courts in
United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n.14 Defendants were indicted for conspiring 15 to make money contributions in connection with a congressional election.' 6
Motions to quash the indictments were denied, and demurrers to the indictments
were overruled. The court was of the opinion that Congress had kept within its
constitutional powers in enacting the statute and that the indictments stated sufficient facts to constitute a statutory offense. The court stated that Congress had the
vested constitutional power to provide laws to regulate federal elections; that the
words "money contributions" were not vague and uncertain but, that their meaning
was plain, and their purpose as used in the act unmistakable; 17 and that the statute
neither prevented, nor purported to prohibit, the freedoms of speech or press.
It was not until 1948 that the courts were again confronted with a case under the
statute, then section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,18 as amended
by section 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.19 In United States
v. CIO,20 the CIO and its president, Philip Murray, were indicted for making expenditures in connection with a special election to elect a representative to Congress
from the Third Congressional District for the State of Maryland. An editorial written
by Murray, favoring one candidate and opposing another, was published in The CIO
News, the union newspaper, and distributed throughout the Third Congressional
District. The editorial stated that its publication was made, despite the statute, in
the belief that the section was an unconstitutional restraint of rights guaranteed by
the first amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, relying on
this same contention. The district court dismissed the indictment on the grounds
that the statute was unconstitutional saying:
The statute contains no exemption or exclusion eliminating from its
prohibitions those activties which the Bill of Rights protects.... It is plain
that Congress by this statutory provision denounced as unlawful acts which
would otherwise be entirely innocent in nature. . . . Judged by its plain
terms, the statute on its face fails to survive the constitutional test.21
The Supreme Court held in an opinion by Mr. Justice Reed that the indictment
failed to allege an offense under the statute, stating:
If § 313 were construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

34 Stat. 864 (1907).
239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
35 Stat. 1096 (1909).
34 Stat. 864 (1907).
The prohibition was extended to expenditures by 61 Stat 159 (1947).
43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
61 Stat. 159 (1947).
335 U.S. 106 (1948).
United States v. CIO, 77 F. Supp. 355, 357 (D.D.C. 1948).
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unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage
to their interests from the adoption of measures, or the election to office of
men espousing such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our minds
as to its constitutionality... We are unwilling to say that Congress by Its
prohibition against corporations or labor organizations making an "expenditure in connection with any election" of candidates for federal office
intended to outlaw such a publication. We do not think § 313 reaches such a
22
use of corporate or labor organization funds.
Thus, the Court did not reach the constitutional issues. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, emphasized his conviction that a proper case had not been presented
for a consideration of thd constitutionality of the act. 23 Mr. Justice Rutledge, joined
by three other members of the Court, wrote a concurring opinion assailing the constitutional validity of the statute. 24 The statute was next considered in United States
v. Painters Local 481.25 The union and its president were convicted for expending
union funds (totaling $143.64) for newspaper and radio publicity attacking Senator
Robert A. Taft and six incumbent congressmen. On appeal defendants did not deny
that the statute, if valid, had been violated, but contended that it was an unconstitutional violation of the first, fifth, sixth, ninth and tenth amendments. The
court of appeals felt that case was similar to the CIO case and held the the statute
did not cover publications effected by the appellants. In referring to the CIO case
the court stated:
While Mr. Justice Reed, who wrote the opinion in that case, laid some
stress upon the fact that the publication was by the union itself and
reached a somewhat limited class of readers, he nowhere said that a publication in an ordinary newspaper paid for out of the funds of a union would
not also be outside of the coverage of the Act ....
In a practical sense the
situations are very similar, for in the case at bar this small union owned
no newspaper and a publication in the daily press or by radio was as natural
a way of communicating its views to its members as by a newspaper of its
own... 26
Thus, the rationale of the CIO case, which created an exception to the broad scope
of section 610, was extended to include the situation where a union had no effective communications media of its own.
The CIO case was again relied upon in United States v. Construction Workers
Local 264.27 The union, its president and secretary were indicted for violating section
610 in having expended funds of the union for contributions or expenditures in
connection with a general election in which Irving, the union president, ran for the
United States House of Representatives. The specific violations charged involved small
expenditures for gasoline for and repairs to vehicles used in Irving's campaign, and

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

335 U.S. at 121, 123-24.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 129.
172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
Id. at 856.
101 F. Supp. 869 (WD. Mo. 1951).
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for the payment of three union employees for personal services.28 Defendants contended that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty, and that the
act was unconstitutional under the first, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth amendments.
As to the allegedly unlawful expenditures for gasoline and repair of vehicles,
court found the evidence insufficient. It was noted that the employees paid
campaigning testified that part of their efforts had promoted Irving's political
terests, but that some of their activities consisted of taking people to register
taking voters to the polls. The district court said:

the
for
inand

It seems difficult for me to believe that the Congress intended that its
definition of "expenditure" should be construed by the court so narrowly as
to apply in a case of this type.... I believe that the Congress did not intend
its definition of "contributions" to apply under the circumstances as shown
by the evidence, and thus it is not necessary to pass upon the constitutionality
of the statute.... Conforming to the view expressed by the Supreme Court
in the C.I.O. case, that the acts charged against these defendants ... are not
violative of the Act, the motion of defendants for a verdict of acquittal with
respect to each of the counts will be and is hereby sustained. 2 9
A great deal of emphasis was placed on the fact that at least part of the efforts
of the employees were directed toward activities which were for the general benefit
of all candidates. Another inroad was made, then, into the breadth of the general
prohibition imposed by the statute. It appeared that the courts were well on their
way to a construction of section 610, which would perhaps render unnecessary a
decision as to the merits of the contentions of unconstitutionality.
The most recent case involving section 610 is United States v. International Union
UAW.s 0 The union was indicted for having violated section 610 by defraying the costs
of certain commercial television broadcasts. It was charged that the broadcastg
urged and endorsed the selection of certain persons as candidates for representatives and senator to the Congress, and included expressions of political advocacy
intended by the defendant to influence the electorate and to affect the results of
the election. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that
(1) it failed to state an offense under the statute, and (2) the provisions of the
statute were unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the indictment on the
ground that it did not allege a statutory offense. The court in so doing apparently felt
that it was following the trend established in the latter three of the four abovementioned cases. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the indictment did
state an offense under the statute and remanded the case to the district court for
trial. 1 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for five other members of the Court wrote
the majority opinion emphasizing that:
To deny that such activity, either on the part of a corporation or a

28. One employee was paid $60.20, a second $59.00, and the third $200.00.
29. 101 F. Supp. at 875, 876, 877.
30. United States v. International Union, UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
31. Upon the subsequent trial of the case the jury returned a verdict of notguilty. N.Y. Times, No. 7, 1957, p. 1, col. 4.
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labor organization, constituted an "expenditure in connection with any
[federal] election" is to deny the long series of congressional efforts calculated to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting
from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations
of capital.32
Although the factual situation was quite similar to that in United States v. Painters
Local 481 that case was ignored. Apparently the liberal construction of section 610,
seemingly authorized by the CIO case, was not to be followed, and the Court's
opinion in that case was to be confined to the facts therein. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
distinguished the CIO case on the grounds that:
United States v. CIO ...presented a different situation. The decision in
that case rested on the Court's reading of an indictment that charged defendants with having distributed only to union members or purchasers an
issue.., of "The CIO News" a weekly newspaper owned and published by the
CIO. .

.

. The organization merely distributed its house organ to its own

people.33
In remanding the case for trial Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested several questions,
at the same time denying that their purpose was to answer problems of statutory
construction, and asserting that they were merely to indicate the covert issues which
might be involved in the case:
[W]as the broadcast paid for out of the general dues of the union membership or may the funds be fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary
basis? Did the broadcast reach the public at large or only those affiliated with
the appellee? Did it constitute active electioneering or simply state the record
of particular candidates on economic issues? Did the union
sponsor the
34
broadcast with the intent to affect the results of the election?
Three members of the Court dissented in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas expressing the view that the statute was unconstitutional:
The Act as construed and applied, is a broadside assault on the freedom
35
of political expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.
These, then, are the five cases in which the statute has been involved. Although
efforts have been made to test the constitutionality of the act, they have not thus
far proved to be successful. Many doubts, seemingly justified, remain as to the scope,
meaning and applicability of section 610.
CONSTiOTNAIT

OF SECTION 610 UNDER T E FmsT A

rmnnsNT

In each of the five cases in which a consideration of section 610 or its forerunners has been concerned the contention has been made that the statute is unconstitutional on the ground, among others, that it is violative of the first amendment. This argument is based on the proposition that the effective exercises of

32.
33.
34.
35.

352 U.S. at 585.
Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 598 (dissenting opinion).
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these freedoms and rights by corporations and labor unions in political activities
necessarily involves the expenditure or contribution of sums of money. It is
asserted that the utilization of modem day communications media, which of course
involves expenditures or contributions, is essential to any real enjoyment of these
freedoms and rights in this area.3 6 Of course, the first amendment does not in
express terms guarantee the freedom to expend or contribute; however, if such
freedoms are necessary to the exercise of the freedoms that are guaranteed, it
would seem to follow that they should be afforded the same protection. If so, then
a prohibition of expenditures and contributions in connection with federal elections
would seem to be a prohibition of freedoms and rights inferentially guaranteed by
the first amendment and deserving of its protection. On its face the statute bars
all expenditures and contributions by corporations and labor organizations in connection with federal elections, and if given a strict interpretation would seem to
be an outright abolition of political expression as far as these groups are concerned.
However, as noted in the examination of the cases, the statute has not always been
so construed and applied, and its effect has been rendered something less than an
absolute prohibition of political expression by the groups concerned.
It seems well recognized that first amendment freedoms and rights are not
37
absolute, and that some restrictions or limitations may be placed on their exercise.
This question of permissible restriction has most often been answered by application
of the clear and present danger test, formulated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schencc
v. United States.38 "The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent ...
-"39 The rule was applied in many subsequent cases, and its development is summarized in Dennis v. United States. 40 As noted in the Dennis case, the
courts have in some cases involving the first amendment declined to use the test.41
The trend in more recent times has been to apply the test, and to apply it without
distinction between statutes making certain acts unlawful (the evidence to support
the conviction being speech) and statutes making the speech itself a crime. While
it is possible that the courts might not base a decision as to the constitutionality of
section 610 on the clear and present danger test, in view of the trend toward its
application observed in the Dennis case, this consideration of the constitutionality of
the statute is for the most part concerned with the effect of applying the test. In the
Dennis case a new expression of the rule was adopted:

36. United States v. International Union, UAW, supra note 32, at 594 (dissenting
opinion). See Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 252, 69 N.E.2d
115, 130, (1946).
37. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652

(1925).
38. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
39. Id. at 52.
40. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
41. Foremost among these cases were Whitney v. California and Gitlow v. New
York, supra note 37.
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Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted
the phrase as follows: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 183 F2d at 212. We adopt this
42
statement of the rule ....
Although it is recognized as a general rule that there is a presumption of constitutionality, there is authority for the proposition that such presumption does not apply
in cases involving a statute which appears to infringe upon first amendment freedoms and rights.43 Therefore, where the clear and present danger test is the
measure of constitutionality, as opposed to the reasonableness test often used in
cases involving statutes having no bearing upon the first amendment, it would
appear that the preferred place occupied by the first amendment strikes a balance
and puts the parties on equal footing insofar as any burden of showing constitutionality or unconstitutionality is concerned.
Restrictions or limitations imposed by a statute upon freedom of speech and
press and the right to assemble and petition are not unconstitutional abridgements
in violation of the first amendment if they are justified by a clear and present
danger. The constitutionality of section 610 would depend, should the courts apply
the test, upon whether a clear and present danger exists to justify the restrictions
and limitations which it imposes. The test by its nature does not lend itself to
abstract application, but is designed for use in reference to the facts of a particular
case. If expenditures or contributions made by a given corporation or labor organization in connection with a federal election were of such a nature as to adversely affect our federal electoral process, there would be little room for doubt
that the gravity of the evil would be sufficient to meet the test. However, the
breadth of the statute makes possible a technical violation under facts where no
grave and serious evil exists. The statute seems to have as its premise the supposition that the expenditure or contribution of money is inherently evil. In a fact
situation where the expenditure or contribution is made in good faith and without
evil design, although the statute would still apparently be violated, there would
be no grave evil to justify its infringement upon first amendment freedoms and
rights. Again, in the second part of the test, which requires a discounting of the
weight given the gravity of the evil in proportion to the improbability of its occurrence, the test must be applied to the facts of the particular case. In the abstract
it might be said that it is unlikely, in view of the historical background which
prompted Congress to enact the statute, that the improbability of the occurrence
or existence of the evil would prove a sufficient discount to cause the statute to
fail to meet this part of the test. Here too, in the circumstances of a particular case,
the broad scope of section 610 might well bring within its purview contributions or
expenditures of such nature that they would render highly improbable the oc-

42. 341 U.S. at 510.
43. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948) (concurring opinion); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931).
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currence of the evils sought to be curbed, but which would be at least a technical
violation of the act. Perhaps an application of the last part of the test gives rise
to the most serious doubts as to whether section 610 would meet the clear and present danger test. Assuming that the evil sought to be prohibited is found to exist
in the facts of a particular case, it remains to be determined whether the evil
"justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger....
(Emphasis added.) In this connection the statute's greatest weakness would seem
to be that it goes beyond that which is necessary to avoid the danger, and instead
of being confined to corrupt practices, encompasses activity which is not objectionable and should be protected by the first amendment. In dealing with the abuse or
evil the statute must not at the same time unnecessarily curtail first amendment
rights.44 The statute must be narrowly drawn to prohibit the specific evil. 45 The
view has been expressed that section 610 in dealing with the evil of corrupt practices unnecessarily curtails first amendment rights, that the statute is not
46
narrowly drawn, but that its scope is unconstitutionally broad and sweeping.
On the other hand those who would support the constitutionality of section 610
have emphasized that its effect has been to impose only a very narrow restriction
upon the participation of corporations and labor organizations in the area of free
political expression and association. In this connection it has been pointed out that
the act is not applicable to individual members or stockholders, and that they may
still engage in political activity on behalf of the group, subject to restriction only
by other sections of the Federal Corrupt PracticesAct.47 This would seem to ignore
or deny the existence of any rights on the part of corporations and labor organizations to protection under the first amendment in the area of free political expression and association. 48 It has been asserted that the exercise of individual rights
and freedoms in this area is no substitute for the exercise of group rights and
freedoms. 49
Another argument urging the vailidity of section 610, which seems to be supported by dictum in the CIO and InternationalUnion cases is that the statute merely
prohibits corporations and labor organizations from making unlimited expenditures or

44. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364-65 (1937).
45. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
46. United States v. International Union, UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (dissenting
opinion), United States v. CIO, supra note 43, at 146 (concurring opinion).
47. One such restriction upon individuals is the $5,000 maximum imposed by 62
Stat. 723 (1948).
48. Organizations were said to be entitled to protection of the first amendment
in United States v. Construction Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951). See also
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941);
and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), holding that freedom of
press -was guaranteed to corporation by the fourteenth amendment. The right of
individuals to form organizations to engage in political activity is protected as a
part of the freedom to assemble guaranteed by the first amendment. Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1939), De Jonge v. Oregon, supra note 44.
49. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948) (concurring opinion), Bowe v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 252, 69 N.E.2d 115, 130 (1946).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 10
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

contributions from their general funds, and that these groups are not restricted or
limited in so using funds which have been built up from the voluntary donations
of members or stockholders. However there is no clear cut decision by the courts
that section 610 is applicable only to situations where the source for expenditures
and contributions is general funds, and that the statute is not applicable where the
source is donations. It must be admitted that this construction is in keeping with
the alleged purposes of the act. It has been observed that the statute is intended
to reduce disproportionate influence upon federal elections, to preserve the purity
of such elections, and to protect that minority of members of labor organizations
and stockholders in corporations who must share the expense of expenditures and
contributions, but who do not share the political views of the majority who direct
such expenditures and contributions. 50 Weight is added to this argument by pointing
to the fact that the Taft-Hartley Act sanctions the union shop, 5 1 thereby giving the
unions greater control over the labor force, and making it necessary in many cases
for one to become a union member in order to work. The conclusion suggested is
that since the government, through the Taft-Hartley Act, has placed the individual
in this situation, the government should afford him protection. This argument, of
course, is inapplicable in the case of corporate stockholders, their status as such
being a matter of their own choosing. The whole minority rights argument has
less force in the case of corporations. The greatest weakness of the protection of
minority rights argument would seem to be the failure to recognize that by and
large corporations and labor organizations are governed by the basic democratic
concept of majority rule. The argument that the rights of the many should be
forfeited in order that the rights of the few might be proteced seems foreign to a
democratic system of government. In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas in the International Union case, the protection of minority rights argument in support of
section 610 would seem to be an argument for "burning down the house to roast the
pig".
In support of the constitutionality of section 610 it has also been suggested
that the statute imposes no prohibition or restriction upon the establishment of
parallel organizations in which membership would be voluntary. The definition
of "labor organizations" in section 610 puts such parallel organizations outside the
scope of the act.52 Since such organizations are not within the statute, its objectives
may be thwarted by their establishment. It is quite possible that such organizations
would spend as much or more money, in the same manner, and for the promotion
of the same interests as would the corporation or labor organization in support of

50. United States v. CIO, supra note 46.
51. The "closed shop" has been prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 140
(1947), but the "union shop" is permitted.
52. The term "parallel organizations" has reference to such groups as CIO-PAC
and the Committee of Political Education (CoPs, AFL-CIO). "Labor organization"
is defined by section 610 as any organization which exists for the purpose of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work. Since these parallel organizations would not exist
for that purpose, they would not come within the statute.
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which they are organized. On its face the statute prohibits all expenditures or contributions in connection with federal elections regardless of the intent with which
they are made, and without any determination necessary as to whether they are
such that would in fact constitute corrupt practices. Legitimate, good faith expenditures or contributions are just as culpable according to the words of the act as
are expenditures or contributions which are made for an ulterior or evil purpose.
Unobjectionable expenditures or contributions by corporations and labor organizations apparently could be punished under section 610 while objectionable expenditures or contributions made by parallel organizations could be made with immunity.
As pointed out above the clear and present danger test, as set out in the
Dennis case, is satisfied by answering the question of whether the gravity of the
evil, as discounted, "justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger... ." It would appear that section 610 may be more of an invasion than
is necessary, and that it not only curbs the evil, but also curtails first amendment
rights and guarantees. The statute is not confined to eliminating the evil which

may be found in expenditures and contributions for corrupt purposes, but extends
to all expenditures whether they are in fact evil or not. To require that fhe statute

be confined to correction of the abuse, and that it not curtail the constitutional
rights concerned is not an unreasonable demand. Clearly Congress may act to reduce disproportionate influence upon federal elections, to preserve the purity of
such elections, and to protect minority rights. However there are other methods
of dealing with the abuse, which do not at the same time curtail the freedoms
and rights guaranteed by the first amendment. Among these is the punishment of
those who actually engage in corrupt practices and threaten the integrity of the
electorial process by making expenditures and contributions in connection with
fedral elections. Another method would be a provision for the prompt public disclosure of all expenditures and contributions in connection with federal elections.
In order to protect minority rights without at the same time abolishing majority
rights, it might be desirable to adopt the "contract in" or "contract out" system for
53
Since secraising funds for political activities, which has been used in England.
tion 610 appears to unnecessarily include within its prohibitions freedoms and
rights guaranteed by the first amendment, the contention that it is unconstitutionally
broad and sweeping would seem to be of merit and demanding of serious consideration.
CoNs

rToNALITY oF SEcTiON 610 UNDER TE F=TH AND SIXTH Am

mmN

The combination of the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the

sixth amendment's provision that an accused shall be informed of the nature

53. Under the "contract in" system it is required that the member make a
positive manifestation of his willingness to contribute. Under the "contract out"
system it is assumed that the member is willing to contribute unless he manifests his
reluctance. See Rothschild, Government Regulation of Trade Unions in Great Britain:
II, 38 COL. L. Rsv. 1335, 1363 (1938).
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of the offense charged, has come to be known as the "ascertainable standard of
guilt" requirement. 54 The test for this doctrine was established in Connally v. General
Constr. Co.55 where the court stated:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on
their part will render them liable to its penalties.... And a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. (Emphasis added.) 56
One of the requirements of a criminal statute under this doctrine is that it
give guidance to the individual in planning his future conduct.57 In view of this,
one part of 'section 610 which could be reasonably questioned is "expenditure in
connection with an election." This phrase could also create difficulty with the
second requirement under this doctrine, which is that the statute must give guidance
58
to those adjudicating the rights of the accused.
In addition to these somewhat abstract requiremnts there are other factors
that have been considered by the Court in determining whether a statute provides
an "ascertainable standard of guilt." The following treatment of some of these Is
not meant to be exhaustive of all such considerations that have been or could be
used by the Court.
If a statute is an apparent restraint upon civil liberties, the usual presumption of
constitutionality may not exist.59 Therefore section 610, which on its face appears
to restrict freedom of speech, probably would not be extended this presumption
since this freedom is assured to corporations and labor unions in addition to their
protection under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.60
Another consideration is whether a practical degree of exactitude has been
obtained by the legislature in relation to the subject matter of the statute. 61 The
following points have been considered by the Court with regard to this problem. The
degree of vagueness may be weighed against the social desirability of the legislative

54. This doctrine was first mentioned in Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904),
and clearly recognized in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909). It was
first used to invalidate a statute in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
216 (1914).
55. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
56. Id. at 391.
57. Ibid.
58. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948). No judicial determination will be
made of a vague statute if to do so would be a legislative function.
59. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). If such a restraint is constitutional
it has been held that it must be confined to precise acts. Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931).
60. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); United States v. Construction Local
264, 101 F. Supp. 869 (Wi). Mo. 1951).
61. Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss4/10

26

1959]

et al.: Editorial Board/Comments

COMMENTS

policy. 62 Whether there are other more specific means available to the legislature has
been considered in at least one case, 63 and the fact that attempts to comply with the
statute would necessarily curtail socially desirable activity may be given some consideration. 64 However, it has been held that if the statutory standard of conduct is
uncertain but of such a nature that it does give warning to those approaching the area
of prohibition, then a person coitinuing toward this area must take the risk of
violating the statute.6 5
Whatever difficulties there may be in determining whether section 610 is
unconstitutionally vague and indefinite may be partically resolved by judicial interpretation. At present an indictment under section 610 would presumably require
allegations that the effects of the expenditure extended beyond members of the
corporation or labor union, 6 6 that it was not a "natural way" of communicating to
members, 67 and that it was made with an intent to influence election results.68
Thus interpreted, these additional required elements tend to provide a more
definite standard for future conduct. The necessity for an intent to influence election
results, and not merely to publish political information to members, indicates that
the statute must be knowingly violated. If so, then it could not be said that section 610
fails to give a warning. 69 Therefore, constitutionality under the fifth and sixth
amendments would not appear to be an issue which would justify invalidation.
A brief consideration should be given to the ninth and tenth amendments, neither
of which is likely to be given much weight in determining whether or not section 610
is constitutional. In view of the express power given to Congress under article I,
section 4 to make or alter existing state regulations as to the manner of holding
federal elections, it is difficult to imagine section 610 violates these two amendments. 70

62. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) (statute, provided that an employer could not be forced to hire more than the "number of employees needed"; held,
no better language could have been used); Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426 (1915)
(statute required hotel operator to do all "within his power" to save guests after a
fire in hotel; held, rules of conduct in this area must be general); Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911) (statute restricting employment to nine hours "except
in case of emergency" held valid).
63. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (statute prohibited transfer of
publication containing to large degree criminal news or lust).
64. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n., 286 U.S. 210 (1932) (statute prohibited oil production in manner constituting "waste"), United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Weeds v. United States, 225 U.S. 109 (1921) (statute
made it unlawful to charge unjust or unreasonable rate for necessaries).
65. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); United States v.
Wurzback, 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
66. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
67. United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1940).
68. United States v. International Union, UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
69. American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Screws v.
United States, supra note 69.
70. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946) (Hatch Act prohibiting
certain political activity by federal employees held valid); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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This position is further strengthened by the seventeenth amendment which has been
held to give the federal government power to protect the electoral processes in
7
senatorial elections. 1
CONCLUSION

The all inclusive prohibitory wording of section 610 leads one to the conclusion
that the statute, on its face, is unconstitutional in that it abridges freedoms and
rights guaranteed by the first amendment and fails to provide an ascertainable
standard of guilt as required by the fifth and sixth amendments. As indicated above,
the Supreme Court of the United States has not to date handed down a decision on
these consitutional issues, but has construed and applied section 610 so as to render
such a determination unnecessary. Thus, while the statute standing alone may be
manifestly susceptible to constitutional objection, it may, nevertheless, be constitutional in view of its construction and application by the Court. Although a
narrow construction of the act was indicated by the earlier decided cases, the Court
has not chosen to follow that trend in its recent decision in the InternationalUnion
case. A narrow construction of section 610 seems to remove many of the constitutional objections apparent from the face of the statute, while a liberal construction
would seem to emphasize these objections. If the Court's future construction of section 610 is as liberal as that made in the International Union case, then a decision on
the constitutionality of the act would probably be necessary and the Court might well
decide that the section is unconstitutional. However, should the court revert to the
narrow construction made in the CIO case, it might hold (1) that a decision as to
constitutionality is unnecessary; or (2) that the act is constitutional as applied.
JOHN E. BuRnuss, Jn.
CH-nLs B. ERIicsoN

SENTENCES FOR CONVICTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL BANK

ROBBERY ACT-A PROBLEM IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION'
The Federal Bank Robbery Act 2 defines several crimes against banks which
are members of the Federal Reserve System, or organized or operating under the
laws of the United States, or the deposits of which are insured by the Federal De-

71. United States v. Aczel, 219 Fed. 917 (D.C. Ind. 1915).
1. The final participants in the Law School annual moot case competition
("Junior Case Club") were presented with a problem of construction and interpretation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1952). The case was presented on April 26, 1958, as a Law Day activity before a distinguished bench consisting of Cullen Coil, Commissioner, Missouri Supreme Court; Marshall Craig, Judge
for the 28th Mo. judicial circuit; William Kimberlin, Judge for the 17th Mo. judicial
circuit. This Comment is a result of the research done by the following student participants: David A. Eggers, Donald L. Dickerson, William W. Quigg and Larry L.
McMullen.
2. 62 Stat. 796 (1950), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1952). Bank robbery and
incidental crimes
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posit Insurance Corporation. Subsection (a) defines in the first paragraph the
offense of bank robbery, and in the second paragraph defines an entry offense in the
nature of burglary. Departing from the common law requirements of breaking and
entering in the night time, this entry offense is complete upon proof of an entry with
intent to commit any felony or larceny. The third paragraph of subsection (a) provides that whoever shall be convicted of the previously defined robbery "or" entry
shall be subject to a maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment. Subsection
(b) defines in the first paragraph the offense of larceny of over $100 in value, and
provides a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. The second paragraph de-

(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts
to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other
thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, or any savings and loan association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, or as a savings and
loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, or in such savings and loan
association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank
or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United
States, or any larcenyShall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both.
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any
property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in
the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, or any savings
and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both; or
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property
or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, or any savings and loan
association, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
(c) Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of,
any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have been taken
from a bank, or a savings and loan association, in violation of subsection (b) of this
section shall be subject to the punishment provided by said subsection (b) for the
taker.
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined
in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy
the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
(e) Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense, or in
freeing himself or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such
offense, kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him without the
consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or punished by
death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct.

(f) As used in this section the term "bank" means any member bank of the

Federal Reserve System, and any bank, banking association, trust company, savings
bank, or other banking institution organized or operating under the laws of the United
States, and any bank the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
(g) As used in this section the term "savings and loan association" means
any Federal savings and loan association and any savings and loan association the
accounts of which are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 796, amended Aug. 3, 1950, c. 516, 64 Stat. 394.
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fines the offense of larceny of under $100 in value, and provides a maximum sentence
of one year imprisonment. Subsections (d) and (e) increase the maximum sentence
for aggravated forms of the offenses defined in (a) and (b).
The problem presented by considering subsections (a) and (b) as a whole is
whether the offenses of robbery, entry, and larceny are separate crimes and so
subject to maximum consecutive sentences for each offense, even though the crimes
result from one continuous transaction. An affirmative answer to this question would
allow the court to impose a twenty year sentence for the entry with intent to commit
an offense and if this intent were consummated in a robbery, the court could impose
an additional consecutive twenty year sentence. Or if the intent were consummated
in a larceny, the court could impose in addition to the twenty years for the entry,
a consecutive sentence for the larceny of ten years or one year, depending on the
value involved. It may be argued that this is the conclusion to be drawn from a
literal interpretation of the statute, but as might be expected the act has not always
been so interpreted. The purpose of this Comment is to indicate the several views
which have been advanced in regard to maximum sentences under the act and to
recognize the interpretations which have been accepted by the federal courts.
Of course, any correct interpretation of the sentences allowed under the Bank
Robbery Act must be grounded on the intent of the enacting Congress. The legislative history of this act fails to indicate what the intent of Congress was in regard
to maximum sentences for the several offenses defined, and so the courts have presumed this intent from the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Bank
Robbery Act and the subsequent amendments.
Prior to 1934, robbery, burglary, and larceny of banks were offenses only under
the state laws. The widespread activity of interstate gangsters prompted legislation
making these crimes federal offenses when committed against banks operating under
the laws of the United States.a However, as finally passed, the legislation included
only the offense of bank robbery, imposing a maximum sentence of twenty years
imprisonment. 4 In 1937, the Attorney General of the United States pointed out that
unless the offense was accompanied by force or intimidation, no federal offense had
been committed, and he asked that Congress include burglary and larceny in the
Bank Robbery Act.5 Accordingly, the act was amended to include these offenses,6
and was re-enacted in 1948 in its present form.7
Whatever disagreement there once may have been, s it is now well settled that
the robbery, entry and larceny offenses under subsections (a) and (b), and the
aggravated forms of these offenses defined in subsections (d) and (e) constitute

3.

78 CONG. Rc. 5738 (1934).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

48 Stat. 783 (1934).
S. Rm. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937).
50 Stat. 749 (1937).
Quoted supra note 2.
United States v. Harris, 26 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
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only one offense for which only one sentence may be imposed. 9 Thus, an accused
cannbi be sentencea to twenty years for simple robbery under (a), and to a consecutive sentence of twenty-five years for robbery by assault with a dangerous weapon
as defined under (d) of the act.
The present problem is not so easy to solve. Is the entry offense defined in
subsection (a) only a different stage of a subsequent robbery or larceny offense and
so only a lesser included part of one of those offenses when consummated? If so,
then the entry with intent offense is not subject to a separate consecutive sentence
when the intent has been carried out, but only the consummated act of robbery or
larceny is subject to sentence. By this interpretation the robbery, entry and larceny
provisions of the act define only one offense and thus the felonious entry may ke
punished only when it is frustrated before consummation into a completed robbery
or larceny. This view has been adopted by the federal courts in Simunov v. United
States,10 Madigan v. Wells,"3. and BarkdolI v. United States.'2 While these opinions
do little to explain their acceptance of the "one offense" view, such a result may be
argued on several grounds. To conclude that Congress intended to define only one
offense, two of the cases relied heavily on the fact that the aggravations defined
in the act have been held not to be separate offenses. It may be further argued that
under the ac% Congress intended for the entry offense to cover only the possibility
of frustrated intent and was content to rely on the punishment prescribed for robbery
and larceny when that intent was consummated.
The weight of authority in the federal courts has rejected this argument and
holds that the entry offense is a separate crime, not affected by any other offense
under the act that might arise out of the same transaction.'s By this view the entry
offense may be punished by a consecutive sentence in addition to that imposed
for the completed robbery or larceny. The cases supporting this view have found the
entry offense a separate crime, while agreeing with settled authority that the aggravated forms of robbery and larceny described by the act are not offenses separate
from the simple robbery and larceny defined by the act.1 4 The conclusion that
the entry offense is a separate crime under the act may be supported by several
arguments. It is recognized that a statute may create separate and distinct offenses
arising from one continuous transaction, even if one criminal intent inspired the
entire transaction. Whether a continuous transaction constitutes two separate
offenses is determined by whether each offense requires proof or facts additional to

9. Remine v. United States, 161 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 331 U.S. 862
(1947); Hewitt v. United States, 110 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 310 U.S. 641 (1940).
10. 162 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1947).
11. 224 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
12. 147 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1945) (dictum).
13. McNealy v. United States, 164 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 848 (1948); Rawls v. United States, 162 F.2d 798 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
781 (1947); Wells v. United States, 124 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
661 (1944); Durrett v. United States, 107 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1939).
14. Durrett v. United States, supra note 13.
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those involved in the other.' 5 These principles were applied to interpret the Federal
Bank Robbery Act in Rawls v. United States.1 6 After finding that proof of larceny and
proof of the entry offense under the act would require different evidence, the court
concluded that the offenses were separate and affirmed the consecutive sentences.
The view that the entry offense is a separate one, separately punishable, may be
supported by reference to the law of burglary. The entry provision of the act defines the offense of burglary excepting the common law elements of breaking
and entering in the night-time. The courts have recognized that the entry offense
is one in the nature of burglary.17 When a burglar carries out his felonious intent,
it may be held that he has completed two crimes which are separately punishable,' 8
or the court may take a more "humane" view 1 9 and punish the defendant for either
the burglary or the following felony, at the prosecutor's choice, but not for both.20
Either way, the burglary is held to be a separate offense, complete after entry with
the requisite intent, and without regard to any felony following the entry. Finally,
in support of the "separate offense" view, it may be argued that Congress intended
for the entry provision to cover not only the situation of frustrated intent, but also
the case where the defendent entered with felonious intent and was successful in
carrying it out. Thus two offenses would be committed, the entry and the felony
following the entry, just as in the case of common law burglary. By this analysis,
it may be assumed that the motive of Congress in the entry provision was similar to
that which underlies all burglary statutes, viz. to deter would-be robbers and
thieves.
Such were the authorities and arguments at the time Prince v. United States21
reached the Supreme Court. This case was taken by that court for the express
purpose of resolving the conflict between the circuits. The defendant entered a bank
through an open door during regular banking hours and consummated a robbery
with a revolver. He was indicted and tried on two counts, the first charging robbery, and the second charging entry of the bank with intent to commit a felony. He
was convicted on both counts and sentenced to twenty years on the first and fifteen
years on the second count, the sentences to be served consecutively. Some years later
he filed a "motion to Vacate or Correct Illegal Sentence." Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
opinion states: "Whether the crime of entering a bank with intent to commit a
robbery is merged with the crime of robbery when the latter is consummated has

15. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Morgan v. Devine, 237
U.S. 632 (1915); Carpenter v. Hudspeth, 112 F.2d 126 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 682 (1940); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 9 (1940).
16. 162 F.2d 798 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 781 (1947).
17. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 106 (1943); Purdom v. United States,
249 F.2d 822, 825 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958); Rawls v. United
States, supra note 16, at 799.
18. Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470, 109 A.2d 89 (1954); State v. Byra, 128 N.J.L.
429, 26 A.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1942); 1 BisHop, CRenmAL LAw § 1062 (9th ed. 1923).
19. 1 BisHop, op. cit. supra note 18, at §§ 1063, 1064.
20. Commonwealth v. Smith, 123 Pa. Super. 113, 186 Atl. 810 (1936).
21. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
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puzzled the courts for several years.... We granted certiorari because of the recurrence of the question and to resolve the conflict."22 (Emphasis added.) After a
brief resum6 of the history of the Bank Robbery Act, the Court stated that it is a
fair inference from the language used by Congress:
that the unlawful entry provision was inserted to cover the situation where
a person enters a bank for the purpose of commiting a crime, but is frustrated
for some reason before completing the crime. The gravamen of the offense
is not in the act of entering, which satisfies the terms of the statute even if
it is simply walking through an open, public door during normal business
hours. Rather the heart of the crime is the intent to steal. This mental element merges into the completed crime if the robbery is consummated. 23
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Court stated the question to be decided in terms of merger, and ruled
that the gravamen of the entry offense is the intent which merges into the completed
crime when a robbery is consummated. Hence the accused could be sentenced to
no more than twenty years. From this it would be reasonable to conclude that a
violation of the entry part of subsection (a) of the statute merges with a larceny
violation of subsection (b) whenever both occur in one transaction, but such does
not seem to be the law.
In Purdom v. United States, 24 the defendant was convicted under an information
charging, in different counts, (1) the entry of an insured bank with the intent to
commit larceny therein and (2) stealing $591.95 belonging to the bank. He was
sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on count (1) and to ten years on count
(2), the sentences to run consecutively. On May 8, 1957, after the Prince decision
was rendered, he filed a motion to vacate and set aside the sentence imposed on
count (1), on the ground that he was subject to imprisonment on both counts for
not more than ten years. The trial court set aside the sentence on count (2), but
retained the sentence of twenty years on count (1).
Purdom appealed, apparently placing his reliance on the Prince case, but the
Tenth Circuit did not agree with the prisoner's interpretation. After first pointing
out that the Supreme Court was not relying upon the common law doctrine of merger
in reducing the sentence of Prince, the court stated that the Supreme Court was
only seeking to ascertain the intent of Congress with respect to the punishment
that might be imposed in case there was both an entry and a robbery offense, and
that the instant problem was the same. The court then mentioned no more of merger
but rested the decision on the supposed intent of Congress that one who commits the
entry offense along with another violation of the statute can be convicted and sentenced for both violations, but the total sentence may not exceed the maximum which
could be imposed for one of the offenses standing alone. In other words, the law,

22. Id. at 324-25.
23. Id. at 328.
24. 249 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958).
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25
as laid down by the Purdom case, and subsequently followed in other decisions,
seems to be settled that the Prince case stands only for proposition that there can be
no pyramiding of penalties, even though the entry provision of the statute establishes an offense separate from all the others and one which does not merge with the
others. If this is true, the merger language of the Supreme Court in Prince meant
nothing and is pure dictum, and the Prince case decided under a writ of certiorari
"to resolve the conflict" resulted in something less than that.

The solution of the Purdom case is particularly interesting for its evasion of
the merger language used by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in the Prince case. In Purdomr the court is able to follow the majority federal court view that the offenses of
robbery, entry, and larceny under the act are separate crimes and so subject to
separate consecutive sentences. The Purdom case decides that all Mr. Chief Justice
Warren meant to say in the Prince case was that the total sentence imposed for
these separate crimes could not exceed the maximum allowed for any one of these
crimes. This interpretation is obviously very different than one to the effect that the
entry merges into the consummated act. The Purdom case and subsequent courts of
appeal decisions following Purdom26 have served to explain Mr. Chief Justice
21
Warren's opinion in the Prince case. The Purdom case would appear to be the law.
DAVID A. Ecaams
LARRY L. McMuu=ru

TESTIMONY BY HUSBAND AND WIFE IN MISSOURI
The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Hawlins v. United
Statesl had the occasion to reaffirm the doctrine allowing a defendant spouse to
prevent the other from giving adverse testimony in a criminal action. The case
involved testimony by defendant's wife who had been imprisoned as a material
witness and released on $3,000 bond conditioned on her being a witness for the
2
United States. The testimony did not appear to be either adverse in and of itself,
or to involve confidential communications. Yet these factors were held not to be
enough, in the light of "reason and experience," to modify the exclusionary rule.
While this Comment discusses Missouri law, the Hawkins case serves to illustrate
the reluctance of American courts, including those of Missouri, to permit one spouse

25. United States v. Williamson, 255 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1958); La Duke v. United
States, 253 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1958). But cf. United States v. White, 156 F. Supp. 37, 38
(ED. Va. 1957); State v. Holloman, -N.C.---, 102 S.E.2d 873, 882 (1958).
26. Ibid.
27. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 946 (1958) for a thorough study of the Prince case and
the Federal Bank Robbery Act and all of their ramifications.
1. 358 U.S. 74 (1958) (Mann Act violation).
2. The testimony of the wife was largely to the effect that she was a prostitute
before and after marrying the defendant.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss4/10

34

1959]

et al.: Editorial Board/Comments

COMMENTS

to testify against the other. The great bulk of departures from this position have
resulted' from statutory enactments rather than judicial relaxation.
At early common law a party in interest was not permitted to testify because of
the fear of perjury. 3 As a husband and wife were, in the eyes of the law, one person,
then ipso facto the spouse of an interested party was also disqualified, in both
civil and criminal cases.
Another common law rule prevented one spouse from giving testimony adverse
to the other. This is the rule discussed in the Hawkins case. Whereas the "one-party"
theory operated absolutely to disqualify the testimony of the non-party spouse, it
appears that the "adverse testimony" rule was and still remains a privilege. 4
The third rule developed at common law prevented, with certain exceptions, the
divulgence by one spouse of confidential communications arising out of the marriage
relationship. 5 This also was just a privilege.
These last two rules of exclbsion were and are grounded on the desirability of
protecting the marriage relationship from the disruptive effects of permitting one
spouse to testify against the other. It may have been that when formulated, these
rules did in fact serve the purpose for which they were created. 'However, at the
present time it is considerably more difficult to justify their raison d'etre in certain
instances.
A review of the early Missouri civil and criminal cases gives evidence of the
use of the three exclusionary rules above noted. There were, however, some exceptions. For example, a party was allowed to testify if he was not the person for whose
immediate benefit the action was brought.6 In 1849 an interested party was made
competent to testify by statute.7 This ended the disqualification as to a spouse of
an interested party.
CoMPErENcY INCivI. AcTIONs
By statutory action in 1865 and 1874 a spouse was rendered competent to testify
for or against the other with regard to businesss transactions conducted by the
witness-spouse as agent for the other.8 If both spouses were parties, then under the
1849 act (removing the interest disqualification) both were competent witnesses
regardless of agency. 9 The same was true where the testifying spouse was the real

3. 8 WxooRor, EvmnEcE § 2227 (3d ed. 1940).
4. 2 & 8 id.§§ 601, 2227.
5. 8 id. § 2333.
6. McCullough v. McCullough, 31 Mo. 226 (1860). This was allowed even though
the party was to receive some ultimate benefit
7. Mo. Laws 1849, at 99, §§ 1, 2, now § 491.010, RSMo 1949.
8. § 5, at 587, G.S. Mo. 1866 (wife); Mo. Laws 1874, at 60, § 1 (husband).
9. Edmondson v. City of Moberly, 98 Mo. 523, 11 S.W. 990 (1889) (damage to
real property seized by husband and wife); Bell v. Hannibal & St. J. R.R., 86 Mo. 599
(1885) (action by husband and wife for death of child); Berlin v. Berlin, 52 Mo. 151
(1873) (divorce).
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10
party in interest although not a party to the suit. But to qualify under the "real

party in interest" exception, such an interest or right had to be one in property
11
and not merely a personal right. And if the interest was only collateral the non12
in the absence of the agency relationparty spouse was not a competent witness,

ship.
The agency exception in the 1865 and 1874 acts resulted in considerable confusion. Some of the specific problems that arose were: (1) when did the agency
14
3
and
(2) what constituted an agent for this purpose?
relationship have to arise?'
1
(3) who could prove that the relationship existed?

These problems did not arise

where the husband was being sued for necessaries purchased by the wife as the marriage itself established the agency and there was no separate question as to its
existence. 1 6 The testimony of the agent-spouse had to be confined to a suit based
17
upon or connected with the business conducted as an agent.
If the marriage relationship had been terminated by way of divorce then the
18
The same was true where one spouse was
ex-spouse was a competent witness.
dead, if the information had not been acquired by virtue of the marriage relationship.19 However, even though the testifying spouse was an agent of the other or

the marriage relationship had been terminated by divorce or death, the privilege of

10. Quade v. Fisher, 63 Mo. 325 (1876); Owen v. Brockschmidt, 54 Mo. 285 (1873).
11. Joice v. Branson, 73 Mo. 28 (1880) (action by husband and wife for injury
to wife).
12. Layson v. Cooper, 174 Mo. 211, 73 S.W. 472 (1903). Compare Landy v. Kansas
City, 58 Mo. App. 141 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894) (husband's interest in wife's real property
is collateral because curtesy abolished by statute), with Pace v. St. Louis S.W. Ry.,
174 Mo. App. 227, 156 S.W. 746 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913) (husband cultivating wife's land
was sufficient interest after curtesy was abolished).
13. Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 25 Mo. App. 524 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887) (if
wife had been agent for transaction before marriage, she could testify).
14. Fishback v. Harrison, 137 Mo. App. 664, 119 S.W. 465 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909)
(signing name not sufficient to create agency); First Natl Bank v. Wright, 104 Mo.
App. 242, 78 S.W. 686 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904) (directing wife to write letter did not
create agency).
15. A spouse was held competent to testify that he or
she had authority to
act as agent for the other. Leete v. State Bank, 115 Mo. 184, 21 S.W. 788 (1893). Early
cases required some other evidence before there was "complete competency."
William's Adm'r v. Williams, 67 Mo. 661 (1878). If one spouse was the real party in
interest, he or she could testify that the other had been appointed as agent. Scrutchfield v. Sauter, 119 Mo. 615, 24 S.W. 137 (1893). Later cases appear to have allowed the
agency to be established solely by the agent-spouse. Ingerham v. Weatherman, 79
Mo. App. 480 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899).
16. Reed v. Crissey, 63 Mo. App. 184 (K.C. Ct. App. 1895) (medical attention);
McAllister v. Barnes, 35 Mo. App. 668 (St. L. Ct. App. 1889).
17. Flannery v. St. Louis I. I. & S. Ry., 44 Mo. App. 396 (St. L. Ct. App. 1891)
(wife could not testify to value of goods purchased by her as agent for husband).
18. McCloskey v. Pultizer Publishing Co., 163 Mo. 22, 63 S.W. 99 (1901); Long
v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668, 54 S.W. 473 (1899).
19. Sells v. Tootle, 160 Mo. 593, 61 S.W. 579 (1901); Stillwell v. Patton, 108 Mo.
352, 18 S.W. 1075 (1891).
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confidential communications remained to exclude that type of testimony if the
privilege was properly exercised.
In 1921 the agency exception was replaced by the present Missouri statute,
which permits a husband and wife to testify for or against the other in civil cases
20
except as to confidential communications.

ComprcY IN

CRnmAL CASES

Statutes enacted in 1877 and 1879 (now appearing as § 546260, RSMo 1949) provided that a criminal defendant was competent to testify in his own behalf although
he could not be required to testify, and that the spouse of a defendant was not incompetent but could testify on behalf of the accused at the "option" of the accused.
The confidental communication privilege is also set forth in this statute, which represents in substance the common law "adverse testimony" rule. The cases decided
under this statute show less confusion than those under the old Missouri statutes
applicable to civil cases, probably because it is more restrictive.
Even at early common law a wife could, over her huband's objection, testify
against him where he was charged with a crime against her. A similar result is
reached in Missouri. 2 1 It is interesting to note that in State v. Kollenborn, 2 2 a 1957
decision, it was held that a wife could voluntarily testify as to the husband's mistreatment of their child when the husband was being prosecuted for that offense.
This result apparently proceeds from the theory that a criminal injury to a child is
analogous to the same type of injury to the mother. If this be so, then it is not
unreasonable to say that the same result should be reached if the parties in the
above case were reversed.
Most of the cases in Missouri permitting a spouse to give adverse testimony over
the defendant-spouse's objection involve bodily injuries inflicted by the defendantspouse against the witness-spouse. This exception has also been extended to prosecutions for abandonment,2 3 though not for disturbance of plaintiff-spouse's peace. 2 4
It might be socially desirable to apply this exception in cases of bigamy, but to date
the Missouri courts have refused to take this step with regard to the lawful wife,
2
although the unlawful wife is permitted to testify. 5

It is generally reversible error to compel one spouse to testify against the other,

20. § 491.020, RSMo 1949. Hughes v. Renshaw, 314 Mo. 95, 282 S.W. 1014 (1926);
Witte v. Smith, 237 Mo. App. 639, 152 S.W.2d 661 (Spr. Ct. App. 1941).
21. State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 S.W. 1106 (1894). But see State v. Evans,
138 Mo. 116, 39 S.W. 462 (1897) (wife could not testify against husband as to his
raping her before their marriage).
22. 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
23. State v. Bean, 104 Mo. App. 255, 78 S.W. 640 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904).
24. State v. Vaughan, 136 Mo. App. 645, 118 S.W. 1186 (K.C, Ct. App. 1909).
25. State v. Pinson, 291 Mo. 328, 236 S.W. 354 (1922).
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even though the defendant-spouse is being prosecuted for an assault on the witness26
spouse.
As could be excepted there have been difficulties concerning the existence or
non-existence of the marriage relationship. An invalid marriage does not prevent
27
purported spouse involved therein from giving adverse testimony. A valid divorce
28
will lift the "incompetency veil" except as to that knowledge acquired by reason
29
relation.
of the marriage
Many of the Missouri criminal cases speak of the "competency'" or "incompetency" of a spouse as an adverse witness. It seems that for the sake of clarity
this should not only be treated as, but also called, a privilege, as a privilege can
be waived but properly speaking, incompentency cannot.
Two other problems closely related to the "adverse testimony" rule are whether
80
a spouse can compel the other to testify, and the extent of cross-examination in
8
criminal cases where the spouse does testify at the "option" of the other. 1 A detailed
discussion of these two points is beyond the scope of this Comment.
CONMDE

AL CozMrMtcATIoNs

In general communications between a husband and wife are privileged and
neither can testify concerning them if proper objection is made.8 2 The present Missouri statutes covering testimony by a spouse have provisions retaining the common
law confidential communication rule. 83 But this "incompetency" is not absolute and
84
can be waived by agreement or by failure to object when testimony is offered.
88
This privilege has been applied to testimony concerning a husband's domicile,
0
an intention to commit a fraud or a criminal offense against a third person,
88
87
amount of income, and threats to kill the other spouse, to mention but a few
examples.

26. §546.260, RSMo 1949. State v. Dunbar, 360 Mo. 788, 230 S.W.2d. 845 (1950).
27. State v. Shreve, 137 Mo. 1, 38 S.W. 548 (1897); State v. Moore, 61 Mo. 276
(1875).
28. Long v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668, 54 S.W. 473 (1899).
29. State v. Kodat, 158 Mo. 125, 59 S.W. 73 (1900).
30. See generally, McQuie, Criminal Law-Assault With Intent to Kilt or to
Do GreatBodily Harm-Specific Intent-Power to Compel Defendant's Wife to testify
Over His Objection, 17 Mo. L. REv. 90 (1952).
31. In general cross-examination in criminal cases is limited to the facts testified
to on direct examination as though the defendant were the witness. State v. Howard,
352 Mo. 410, 177 S.W.2d 616 (1944).
32. Berlin v. Berlin, 52 Mo. 151 (1873).
33. § 546.260, RSMo 1949 (criminal); § 491.020, RSMo 1949 (civil).
34. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 230 S.W.2d 184 (St. L. Ct. App, 1950).
35. In re Ozias' Estate, 29 S.W.2d 240 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930).
36. Dickinson v. Abernathy Furniture Co., 231 Mo. App. 303, 96 S.W.2d 1086
(K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
37. McPheeters v. McPheeters, 207 Mo. App. 634, 227 S.W. 872 (Spr. Ct. App.
1921).
38. O'Neil v. ONeil, 264 S.W. 61 (St. L. Ct. App. 1924) (divorce).
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Whether or not a communication is privileged is a question for the court 3 9 To
be privileged, the communication must pass between the husband and wife while
they are alone.4 0 If made in front of a third person capable of comprehending
such a communication, it is usually not privileged. 4 1 Apparently this is not because
of the nature of the conversation, but because the presence of a third person clearly
shows that the communicator could not have intended that it be confidential. If
the same or a similar statement is later made to a third person this does not destroy
the privilege, since it is the intent of confidence at the time of communication that
controls regardless of subsequent acts. 42 It is presumed that all communications
between a husband and wife are confidential and the party asserting the contrary
43
must satisfy the court that the reasons for this exclusion do not exist.
In view of the requirement that for a statement to be privileged the husband
and wife must be alone, it is natural that a letter written by one spouse to the other
spouse and their children is not privileged. 4 4 If written just to the spouse, it is
privileged as to the receiving spouse even though that spouse subsequently allows
4 5
a third person to read it.
One of the more prevelant exercises of the confidential commuication privilege
occurs in divorce actions. Some of the earlier divorce cases seemed to reach a rather
questionable result by a very vigorous exclusion of this type of testimony, even
when the divorce action was based in part on opprobrious epithets. 4 6 At the present
time in divorce actions statements which constitute a verbal assault will be admitted
even though no one else was present, if some physical act of assault accompanied
the statement. 4 7 The reasoning in this type of holding is that such statments are
outside the confidential communication privilege, rather than exceptions to it. They
become merged in the assault and are received as the res gestae of the assault.
The confidential communication privilege will be required to yield where to
permit its exercise would result in injustice as between the husband and wife. This
rule which is said to be based on necessity, was applied in an action for an accounting
in connection with an alleged joint adventure between a husband and wife.4 s This
can only be used where the action is between the spouses. It is very similar in operation to the exception to the adverse testimony rule in criminal cases which permits

39. Hull v. Lyon, 27 Mo. 570 (1858).
40. Forbis v. Forbis, 274 S.W.2d 800 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955).
41. Long v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668, 54 S.W. 473 (1899); Tucker v. Tucker, 224 Mo.
App. 669, 31 S.W.2%i 238 (Spr. Ct. App. 1930). Cf. Schierstein v. Schierstein, 68 Mo.
App. 205 (St. L. Ct. App. 1896) (Privilege not disturbed by presence of nine-monthold baby).
42. Revercomb v. Revercomb, 222 S.W. 899 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920).
43. Allen v. Allen, 60 S.W.2d 709 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933).
44. State v. St. John, 94 Mo. App. 229, 68 S.W. 374 (St. L. Ct. App. 1902).
45. Knapp v. Knapp, 183 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1916).
46. Ayers v. Ayers, 28 Mo. App. 97 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887).
47. O[Neil v. O'Neil, 264 S.W. 61 (St. L. Ct. App. 1924).
48. Brooks v. Brooks, 357 Mo. 343, 208 S.W.2d 279 (1948).
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testimony where the defendant-spouse is being prosecuted for a crime against the
other spouse.
In the situation where the husband and wife are being sued jointly, if one gives
adverse testimony of a confidential nature, that evidence can only be used against
the testifying spouse and not against the other.49
If the confidential communications are overheard by a third person then the
latter can testify as to them regardless of how they were overheard. 50 However, if
the communication is intercepted by the connivance of the other spouse it is still
privileged at least with regard to letters.5 1 Presumbly the same would hold true
as to oral statements.
Divorce does not destroy the privilege as to pre-divorce communications, at least
in criminal actions. 52 The same general theory has been followed with regard to the
53
death of one spouse.
WAIVER
It was held by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in 1950 that if the confidential
communication privilege is waived it "opens the door" for proof of other such communications. 54 If we are going to have this privilege then it seems difficult to justify
such a ruling which is much different from saying that the privilege is lost as to
the specific testimony when it is not properly claimed. The latter appears to be the
more rational view.
The "adverse testimony" rule is merely a privilege, and therefore is waived if
not properly asserted. 55
CONcLUsION
Regardless of the theory used to support the "adverse testimony" and confidential
communication rules, there are instances where they should be modified if not
completely abandoned. Missouri has progressed from the common law theory, which
excluded almost entirely all testimony by a spouse, to the point where a spouse's
testimony will be admitted unless it is adverse to a defendant-spouse in a criminal
action or involves confidential communications. Yet there remain certain areas
where a spouse's testimony could be admitted without seriously affecting the marital
relation. Where, for example, the parties are divorced or have been separated for a
long period of time it is difficult to justify exclusion of this kind of testimony.

49. Strode v. Frommeyer, 115 Mo. App. 220, 91 S.W. 167 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
50. Long v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668, 54 S.W. 473 (1899); Tucker v. Tucker, 224 Mo.
App. 669, 31 S.W.2d 238 (Spr. Ct. App. 1930).
51. Malmer v. Linck, 70 Mo. App. 380 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897).
52. State v. Kodat, 158 Mo. 125, 59 S.W. 73 (1900).
53. Spradling v. Conway, 51 Mo. 51 (1872).
54. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 230 S.W.2d 184 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950).
55. State v. Hill, 76 S.W.2d 1092 (Mo. 1934).
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The Missouri courts and most other American courts, have been most reluctant
to modify these rules. No doubt relief will have to come from the General Assembly.
Considering the difficulty in drafting legislation which would permit a spouse to
testify more freely and yet adequately protect the marital relation, it is unlikely
that any change in the present law will be made for some time.
CIAMES B. ERcIsoN
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